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ficers."3" It appears then that the West Virginia court would be in
harmony with the Camara holding in interpreting the state constitu-
tion when appeal is made to the state constitutional right.
The Camara decision fits the pattern of recent Supreme Court
cases which have expanded individual rights. The effect of the
warrant requirement on administrative inspections is yet to be ob-
served. That it would lead to wholesale refusals to admit inspectors
without warrants into homes is doubtful. Such refusals have been
few in the past and are not likely to increase as the inspections are
beneficial to the occupant and are generally accepted as useful.
The issuance of warrants under a different set of rules for probable
cause should not weaken the probable cause requirement as applied
in criminal cases. Competent magistrates should have no difficulty
distinguishing between the administrative and criminal cases and
applying the proper probable cause test. Camara has underscored
and strengthened the citizen's right to be free from unreasonable or
arbitrary searches.
John Reed Homburg
Constitutional Law-Due Process in Juvenile Court Proceeding
Petitioner, a 15-year old boy, was committed to a state in-
dustrial school after he allegedly made a lewd telephone call to a
female neighbor. He was adjudicated delinquent in an unusually
informal juvenile court proceeding, with no sworn testimony, the
complainant not being present, and without notification to either the
petitioner or his parents of the right to be represented by counsel.
Gerald Gault was committed to the industrial school for the
period of his minority, unless sooner released, under code provisions
of the state of Arizona.' The boy's parents petitioned for a writ
of habeas corpus in the county superior court, alleging that the
procedure used in the juvenile proceeding violated the petitioner's
constitutional rights. The county court dismissed the petition and
30 State v. Andrews, 91 W. Va. 720, 727, 114 S.E. 257, 260 (1922).
'Auz. REv. STATS. § 8-201-6 (1956). In contrast, an adult, convicted
in the criminal court for the same offense, would have been subject to a fine
of $5.00 to $50.00 or imprisonment in jail for not more than two months.
Asz. REv. STATS. § 13-377 (1956).
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the Arizona Supreme Court affirmed. The United States Supreme
Court granted an appeal. Held, reversed and remanded. In a
lengthy opinion by Mr. Justice Fortas the Supreme Court reasoned
that the age of the defendant does not preclude his right to constitu-
tional privileges in an accusatorial proceeding. In re Gault, 387
U.s. 1 (1967).
This case is being heralded as a landmark decision. It attacks the
basic concept of the existing juvenile court procedures and is in har-
mony with the present dominant trend refining due process rights
in accusatorial proceedings. Herein the Supreme Court accords
accused juveniles the same basic constitutional rights as accused
adults in criminal proceedings.
Juvenile courts and juvenile court laws grew from abhorrence
of an earlier day's court procedure when children were treated
as adults, and a child of tender years could be marred for life
by criminal conviction and imprisonment with hardened criminals.
Men of good will accomplished reform by replacing notions of
punishment with concepts of care and rehabilitation.' The philo-
sophy of juvenile court acts was to allow the state to offer assistance
and training for the juvenile when there was some demonstrated
need and justification for it. State intervention in a child's life was
to avoid the stigma of criminal guilt. The procedure in a juvenile
case was to be informal, civil and not criminal in nature, and,
therefore, the specific criminal safeguards were not applied.4 This
idea was upheld on the theory that the state was acting as parens
patriae for the child's protection, as in a guardianship situation,
and was not accusing the child of crime with view to punishment.'
The reformers, by substituting the old equity concept of parens
patriae (the state owes a duty of protection to children that it
does not owe to adults) for adult criminal procedure, established
for the young offender a unique form of justice. This policy was
carried out by conglomerating environment, psychology and medi-
cine, then, superimposing the product of the conglomeration on to
2 Mack, The Juvenile Court, 23 HAavAnn L. BEv. 104 (1909).
3 Bloch & Flynn, DELINQUENCY, The Juvenile Offender in America Today,
305-307 (1956).4 Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678 (1923). In re Holmes, 379 Pa.
599, 605, 109 A.2d 523, 525, (1954), a more recent case, stated, "Juvenile
courts are not criminal courts. The constitutional rights granted to persons
accused of crime are not applicable to children brought before them.' (em-
phasis added).5 Paulsen, Fairness to the Juvenile Offender, 41 MuNN. L. RPv., 547, 549(1957).
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the law with the final result being "justice."6 This dogmatic ap-
proach did not go uncriticized. The basic fallacy with this
philosophy, as the critics saw it, was the possibility of the removal
of the child from his home and the deprivation of his liberty by
what appeared to be an arbitrary and discretionary function. Many
writers were caustic, noting that the courts accorded to known
criminals and enemy aliens the very constitutional rights that
were being denied to children being sent to reformatories.7 As
juvenile courts became more crowded and the margin for error
became greater, and as the constitutional rights of due process
for adults criminally accused became more clearly refined by the
Supreme Court, critical comment became more widespread and
more pointed.8
Observers of the Court in recent years could well have pre-
dicted the decision in Gault. This trend of due process holdings
reached a crescendo in the 1960's with three familiar criminal pro-
cedure cases, Gideon v. Wainwright,9 Escobedo v. Illinois,"' and
Miranda v. Arizona." The soundings for Gault were heard in
Kent v. United States 2 (where the issue was limited to applicability
of due process guarantees in a waiver of jurisdiction hearing in a
juvenile court to the criminal court) which held that the child
must be given proper notice of such hearing and advised of his
right to be represented by counsel. Justice Fortas observed that
the child in juvenile court had possibly obtained the worst, rather
than the best, of both worlds of so-called rehabilitation and in-
formality of procedure.' 3 Commenting on the right to counsel the
Court in Kent noted that it was not mere formality or a "grudging
6 Paulsen, Kent v. United States: The Constitutional Context of Juvenile
Cases, 1966 S. CT. REv. 167, 170-73.
z Onley, Juvenile Courts-Abolish Them, 13 CAL. STATE B.J. 1, 2 (1938).8 Paulsen, supra note 6, at 174. E.g., "Why should the fundamental law
hamstring the state in its attempt to do good?"
9 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Court held that a criminal conviction without
the assistance of counsel was violative of the Fourteenth Amendment and was
a denial of due process.
10378 U.S. 478 (1964). The Court held that police interrogation of
accused while refusing to allow accused the assistance of counsel was violative
of due process and thereby renders inadmissible in a criminal trial any incrimi-
nating statement elicited by the police during the interrogation.
11 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The Court held that the failure to warn the
accused of his right to remain silent was violative of accused's privilege
against self-incrimination, and that an individual has the "right to remain
silent unless he chooses to speak in the unfettered exercise of his own free will."
12 383 U.S. 541 (1966).
13 Id. at 561.
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gesture to a ritualistic requirement" but that it was the "essence of
justice."" This was the foundation for the far-reaching decision in
Gault.
In applying the due process guarantees to juvenile court pro-
ceedings, the Supreme Court has radically changed the present
concept and procedure of the juvenile court. The Court has held:
(1) the juvenile court must ensure that the alleged delinquent is
given timely notice (to the child and his parent) of the "charges"
against him; (2) that he has the right to counsel in any case in
which a commitment could be made; (3) the child must also have
the right to cross examine the complainant and any other witnesses
called against him; and (4) the revelant authorities must ensure
that the child is given adequate cautioning against self-incrimina-
tion. The Court raised other important questions discussion of
which space does not here permit. 5
Juvenile court procedure in West Virginia is set forth in chapter
49, article 5 of the West Virginia Code. The code provides that a
defendant shall be duly summoned into court and shall appear and
answer on the return day of the summons or if the summons is
served less than one day prior to the return day, then he shall ap-
pear on the following day."6A juvenile may be brought before the
court either by petition of a reputable person or by certification of
another court when it is ascertained that the person is under
eighteen years of age.'" Upon the filing of the petition the juvenile
judge shall set a time for the hearing.'" In West Virginia a juvenile
would have at least twenty-four hours' notice. The juvenile court
may, upon request of the child or the person named in the petition,
appoint counsel to represent the child.'9 However, the West Vir-
ginia Supreme Court of Appeals has held that where no request is
made for counsel the failure of the court to appoint counsel does not
render the proceedings void."0 The law for juveniles in West Vir-
141d
.Is The Court discussed, without deciding, the issues of double jeopardy,
speedy and iPublic trial, trial by jury, and the rules of evidence. For a short
discussion of these issues, see Lefstein, In re Gault, Juvenile Courts and
Lawyers, 53 A.B.A.J. 811, 813 (Sept. 1967). See also, Double Jeopardy and
Waiver in Juvenile Delinquency Proceedings, 23 FED. PROB. 43 (Dec. 1959).
16 W. VA. CODE ch. 49, art. 5, § 9 (Michie 1966).
'
7 W. VA. CODE ch. 49, art. 5, § 7 (Michie 1966). The petition shall be
verified by oath, shall name the parent or guardian and shall give his address
if known.
18 Id.
19 W. VA. CoDE ch. 49, art. 5, § 13 (Michie 1966).2 0 State v. Mills, 144 W. Va. 257, 107 S.E.2d 772 (1959).
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ginia has been to "protect and reclaim" by allowing a great deal
of discretion with the juvenile court judge.' It would appear that
West Virginia procedure is anomalous to the holdings in Gault.
The guidelines for future juvenile proceedings in West Virginia
must be revised to conform with the rulings in Gault. This can be
accomplished either by the Legislature, as part of a comprehensive
statutory overhaul, or by the Supreme Court of Appeals on a case
by case basis. Regardless of the method of revision, it is clear that
accused juveniles in juvenile court proceedings now have the
right to counsel, the right of cross-examination, protection against
self-incrimination, and timely notice of "charges" against them.
Gault requires "due process of law" in juvenile court proceedings.
John Hampton Tinney
Constitutional Law-Who May Constitutionally Issue A Warrant?
P, arrested on a warrant issued by a lieutenant of police, was
charged with disorderly conduct and resisting arrest. The city
charter authorized captains and lieutenants of police, in the ab-
sence of the chief of police, to issue warrants for offenses in
violation of ordinances of the city. P claims that the ordinance
constitutes an unconstitutional delegation of judicial authority in
contravention of the separation of powers provision of the state
constitution.' The lower court upheld the constitutionality of the
ordinance and the validity of the warrants. Held, affirmed. The
court held in a 3-2 decision that, at the lower levels of government,
there must necessarily be an overlapping of functions in responsible
officials and that issuance of a warrant is the type of an act which
does not require or involve the exercise of supreme judicial power
within the meaning of that term as used in the constitution. State
ex rel. Sahley v. Thompson, 151 S.E.2d 870 (W. Va. 1966).
The factual situation of this case presents succinctly a basic con-
stitutional issue which the courts of this country have had to resolve
in the past and most certainly will be confronted with in the future.
21 50 Ops. W. VA. AT'ey GEN. 257 (1963).
' "The legislative, executive and judicial departments shall be separate and
distinct, so that neither shall exercise the powers properly belonging to either
of the others; nor shall any person exercise the powers of more than one of
them at the same time. . .. ' W. VA. CONST. art. V, § 1.
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